This paper proves existence of a multiplicity of equilibria in a 2-period TGE model with money and nominal rigidities. Households have incomplete preferences and firms reach decisions through the "control principle" (cf. Drèze 1989). * Preliminary -not to be quoted
erwise, the model and assumptions are standard.
1.2. The economy extends over 2 periods with S possible states tomorrow s = 1, · · · , S and state 0 today. I write S for the set S = {0, 1, · · · , S} and for its cardinality S + 1, and I write S for the set S = {1, · · · , S}. Prices and profits are evaluated as of beginning of periods.
Transactions take place in continuous time and consist in exchange of commodities (or services) for "cash". Households and firms keep accounts with the bank; deposits (positive balances) earn no interest; they are thus fully equivalent to (here stand for) cash holdings; overdrafts (negative balances) are subject to interest charges at rates r = (r 0 , r 1 , · · · , r S ), exogenously given (set by the bank); interest is paid at end of period. There is a safe nominal bond issued at the beginning of period 0 for a price ϕ ∈ [0, 1] and paying 1 at time 1 (end of period 0) in every state.
Define ρ 0 := 1−ϕ ϕ , so that ϕ = 1 1+ρ 0 ; ρ 0 ≥ 0 is the interest rate on bonds -a market clearing rate.
The bond transactions of a household b h may have either one of two purposes: (i) to reallocate resources between periods 0 and 1; or (ii) to anticipate financial flows linked to current trades in commodities. The second purpose may consist in buying bonds paid for by a bank loan to be reimbursed by the proceeds of net sales occurring early in the period; or in selling bonds and holding the proceeds in (cash or) bank deposit to finance net purchases early in the period.
From the viewpoint of the households, all the type (ii) financial transactions are in the nature of interest swaps; they leave unchanged the gross proceeds from trade in commodities; they enter the budget constraint by adding interest terms to the trade proceeds -but do not otherwise affect preferences or feasibility.
From the viewpoint of the bank, the beginning of period balance sheet consists of deposits and loans, as resulting from the financial transactions of households just described. As the period unfolds, the households deposit the proceeds of their sales or withdraw the value of their purchases. These aggregate amounts match, so that the balance sheet of the bank remains constant.
It simplifies notation w.l.o.g. to assume that the bond transactions of households amounting to interest swaps are met by the bank and settled at the end of the initial period -thus do not enter the period 1 budgets.
The initial balance sheet of the bank will thus include bond holdings when deposits exceed overdrafts, or bond sales when overdrafts exceed deposits.
As for households, the bonds settled at the end of period 0 enter that period's budget constraints for interests only.
In period 1, state s, ρ s is an interest rate on time deposits, set by the bank.
Households
2.1. Households consume vectors x h ∈ X h ⊂ R S L ; they are endowed with initial resources ω h ∈ int X h ; their net trades are denoted z h := x h − ω h .
To satisfy a cash-in-advance constraint in continuous time, they may hold initial bank deposits m h ds ≥ 0, s ∈ S, financed by bonds 3 repaid with interest The prices p 0 of commodities ∈ L II in period 0 are subject to lower boundsp 0 > 0, entailing the possibility of excess supply -to be eliminated by quantity constraints on net sales. For household h, the net supply of
Similarly, a constraint on the net supply of commodity 0 by firm j will take the form y , all h ∈ H and j ∈ J , obtained as primitive functions of, and adding up to σ 0 . 5 And I definê
If transactions pz > 0 occur at a constant rate within the period, then interest charges ρ m d + rm are minimal with m d = pz(r − ρ)/r and m = pz ρ/r.
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Simple examples are provided by uniform rationing, proportional rationing, predrawn random rationing, a.s.o..
Incomplete preferences over X h are modeled by the preference correspondence P h : X h → X h defined by P h (x) = {x ∈ X h | x x}, the subset of X h collecting the elements x identified as strictly preferred to x. A simple monotonicity assumption will entail that P h (x) is non-empty:
Two conditions on preference correspondences enter the assumptions of the Shafer-Sonnenschein theorem. They will be required for preferences over elements of the household's feasible set, namely the intersection ofX h with the household's budget set. But it aids intuition to define and discuss these conditions first for X h . The conditions boil down, in this introductory discussion, to:
, where HP h (x) denotes the convex hull of P h .
Under complete preferences, the standard assumption of convex preferences 6 entails that the preference correspondence P h is convex-valued, so that (Ca) holds. 7 The standard continuity assumption on preferences requires that the sets P I h (x) := {x ∈ X h | x x} be closed. This implies Debreu (1959, p. 57) . Thus, (Ca) and (Cb) on
X h are weakenings of the standard convexity and continuity assumptions on household preferences; the main dimension of "weakening" lies with the allowance for incomplete preferences.
The role of the standard assumptions is to derive the properties of demand correspondences required to invoke Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, namely convex-valuedness and upper hemi-continuity. Similarly, I want to invoke (Ca) and (Cb) for preferences over household decisions in period 0,
i.e. choices of initial consumption and portfolios. So I turn next to feasible sets for these decisions.
In the sequel, I shall work with the intersection ofX(p, σ) with a hypercube (of length) K centered at 0 and containing all feasible allocations.
I assume, for all h ∈ H:
2) The correspondences χ h (p),X h (p) and X h s (x 0 ) are convex-valued and continuous; their intersections with K are closed-valued.
(A.2.
3) The correspondence χ h (p) is linear homogeneous in pz and m; that
2.2.
Households receive signals
; these signals define the initial budget constraints
(2.1)
. I write henceforth (2.1') for that condition and (2.1) together, andB h 0 (ξ 0 ) for the constrained budget set incorporating the supply constraints.
The feasible set for d h 0 is thus
Lemma 1 The correspondence defined by (2.2) is continuous for p I 0 > 0.
Proof. (2.2) defines the feasible set F h 0 (ξ 0 ) as the intersection of three correspondences, namely the budget set (2.1), the consumption-and-transactions setX h 0 (ξ 0 ) ∩ K, and the set, say Γ h 0 (σ 0 ), defined by the quantity constraints
It is convenient to combine first the inequality in (2.1) 
0 with x ≤ ω h 0 and a continuum of m-values. The intersection of these two convex interiors is non-empty, and the intersection of the two correspondences is l.h.c. (Hildenbrand, 1974, Problem 6-(2) , p. 25), hence continuous.
Households know that they will receive tomorrow in state s the signal In order to define the prospective budget constraints of the households tomorrow in state s, the signals ξ 1 s must be extended to profits of the firms and of the bank,
Using the profit levels V j s , one defines the budget constraints of the households tomorrow as
The feasible set for household h at s is well-defined given
By a straightforward transposition of the proof of Lemma 1, one verifies:
Lemma 2 The correspondence defined by (2.4) is continuous for p I s > 0.
it needs not be unique, but alternative selections are mutually indifferent.
) defined for all states s and signals ξ s . The preferences among deci-
should thus reflect preferences among the associated consumption profiles.
I henceforth write x(d h 0 ) for a consumption profile associated with d h 0 .
The incomplete preferences of household h over current decisions
h ) will be represented by the preference correspondence
will be assumed to satisfy extensions of the conditions (Ca) and (Cb), justified again by reference to standard convexity and continuity properties of consumption preferences.
The standard approach in TGE 9 is to: (i) associate with a portfolio
that preferences among vectors (x h 0 , x s (ξ s )) are represented by an expected
, where the expectation is computed with subjective probabilities ψ h (ξ s | ξ 0 ) assumed unique, tight 10 and continuous.
It is worth noting that the separation of utilities and probabilities is arbitrary under state-dependent preferences. 11 It is thus equivalent to ex-
. Convexity (and continuity) of preferences among such vectors is part of the standard approach. Note also that convexity of preferences among pairs of vectors like
The link between complete consumption preferences and preferences over See Grandmont (1977 Grandmont ( , 1988 , Jordan (1977) or Sondermann (1974) 10 "Tight": for every ε > 0, there exists a compact subset C ⊂ R
S(2L+1)
such that
See Drèze and Rustichini (2004) for a survey of this issue.
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This is assumed, for instance, by Balasko (2003, p. 2) "for the sake of simplicity ... though it would be more appropriate, if technically more demanding, to assume this set to be infinite". Under incomplete preferences, a finite support is natural. 
The other property that I wish to assume for
This property can be spelled out as follows. For some ξ 0 , let the indirect utility function defined on incomes and prices.
Under given consumption x h 0 , the preferences over portfolios (θ h , b h ) may be interpreted as reflecting the indirect utilities of income at node 0 given ξ 0 (hence p 0 ) and at nodes s given ξ s (hence p s ). Indeed, a given portfolio (π, b) has a cost today (πθ h + ϕb h ) and yields incomes tomorrow (θ h V + b h ).
Accordingly, preferences over income streams are implicit in preferences over portfolios (over current decisions) -hence satisfy (CF 0 a) and (CF 0 b).
In Section 3, I shall be concerned with preferences over (marginal) variations in incomes under given initial signals ξ 0 and decisions d h 0 (ξ 0 ). The relevant definitions of "incomes" are then:
Variations in incomes will be denoted ∆W h = (∆W h 0 , (∆W h s (ξ s )) s∈S,ξs∈Ξs ).
Preferences over such variations follow from preferences over the associated variations in consumption at the given prices (p 0 (ξ 0 ), p s (ξ s ) s∈S ). Standard assumptions would imply that preferences over ∆W h are convex and continuous. I shall assume that they satisfy (Ca) and (Cb).
Ξs be defined by
Ξs .
Firms
3.1. A firm j is defined by its production set Y j ⊂ R L(S+1) , by a set of S + 1 transactions correspondences Ψ j s (p s ), s = 0, 1, · · · , S defining the feasible pairs (y j s , n j s ) in function of the prices p s , and by a correspondence J j (Θ) ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , H} defining the firm's "control group" (veto players for production decisions, more on this below). For each s, n j s = (n 
In the GEI approach, a production decision for firm j is an (L+ 2)(S +1) vector (y j , n j ) = ((y As an illustration, think of I j as the "board of directors" for firm j. A modification of the firm's production plan requires approval by every board member and by a majority of shareholders. So, the director(s) is (are) veto player(s), and majority voting is immune to the Condorcet paradox. 15
The resulting decision criterion defines only a partial ordering of production plans, leaving room for multiple equilibria. But that partial ordering satisfies the two conditions required for reliance upon the ShaferSonnenschein (1975) Thus, the "control group" is not itself a primitive, as it is allowed to reflect equilibrium shareholdings (endogenous). Only the statutory rule defining the control group on the basis of equilibrium shareholdings is exogenous. As noted in Drèze (1989) , the approach can readily be extended to multistage control (e.g. majority voting inside the control group) and to (partial) delegation of authority to the board, or to management; also how absentee ownership could be reflected in the majority rule; a.s.o..
Remark 3.1. Under incomplete preferences, it would be natural to replace the simple majority rule
2 by the weaker requirement Thus, replacing the decision δ j by the feasible alternativeδ j entails for shareholder h the collection of "income effects"
Examples: all shareholders owning at least α% of the shares; the n leading shareholders; the leading shareholders owning together β% of the shares; a.s.o..
and likewise for
Accordingly, initial shareholder h will favor the replacement of δ j byδ j is and only if the income effects (∆W h 0 , ∆W h s (ξ s )) defined in (3.1) are desirable (are preferred to the status quo); that is:
Condition (3.2) may be inserted into condition (ii) defining the "control principle". Before commenting further on the rationale of (3.2), I note that It thus follows from assumptions (CWa) and (CWb) that:
as defined by (3.2) satisfies properties (Ca) and (Cb).
Lemma 4 P j (d j ) as defined by the control principle and (3.1) satisfies properties (Ca) and (Cb).
Proof.
Ad (Ca). Let h ∈ I j . Then,
Ad (Cb). P j (·) has open graph if and only if, for all
According to the control principle,d j ∈ P j (d j ) implies the existence of a set of shareholdersÎ j , I j ⊆Î j , Drèze (1989, p. 127 ) that P j (·) is robust to rescalings of θ j when π j = 0 with h θ hj < 1.
Existence theorem
Definition 4.1 A TGE for the economy described above is defined by:
• a set of decision rules (δ h ) h∈H and (δ j ) j∈J with node 0 components
• a set of node 0 signals (ii) if π j = G with h θ jh > 1, I introduce an aggregate demand constraint on shareholdings γ j , translated into individual constraints j (γ j ) > 0,
, where the functions j are single-valued continuous.
Part I.
I.a. I consider the abstract economy defined by H + J + 1 agents:
and preferences defined by P h (δ h );
and preferences defined by P j (δ j );
• n = H +J +1, the market agent, with decision (q, ψ, ϕ) and preferences
It is immediate that P n (·) has open graph, and that (q, ψ, ϕ) / ∈ H P (q, ψ, ϕ), a convex set. Also, the domain of P n (·) is (constant, hence) continuous. As for P h (·) and P j (·), similar properties have been established in Sections 2 and 3. As for the side-condition "p I 0 > 0" in Lemma 1, it is sown below that it is always satsified at equilibrium, so that the device in Greenberg (1977) permits ignoring that condition.
The bank is not introduced as a separate agent, but it is understood that V 0 0 is defined by (v) in Definition 4.1 and V 0 s is part of ξ s ∀ s ∈ S.
The prices p 0 and the aggregate supply constraints σ 0 are defined as follows, wherep 0 ≥ 0 denotes the lower bounds on p 0 (as part of the primitives):
Similarly the prices π j and the aggregate demand constraints γ j are defined as follows:
3)
The aggregate demand constraint γ j is transposed to households h through continuous functions.
Applying the Shafer-Sonnenschein theorem, the abstract economy has an equilibrium. I next show that it is a temporary equilibrium as per Definition 4.1 for the economy of this Part I, and label it a (G, ε)-equilibrium.
It departs from an equilibrium for Definition 4.1 in a single respect: the allowance for demand rationing on the asset markets (when γ j < K).
I.b.
1. From the preferences of the market agent, it follows that ϕ h b h ≥ 0, because otherwise ϕ = 0 would be preferred by the market agent.
2. From the preferences of the market agent, it follows that
If h θ jh − 1 < 0, the market agent chooses ψ j = 0, implying π j = 0.
3.
Since τ 2 ≥ 0 by (2) and τ 3 ≥ 0 by (1), it must be that τ 1 ≤ 0.
Indeed, if p 1 = q 1 = 0, then z 1 = K by strict monotonocity, and q > 0 implies z = K, so that qz = AK.
If there exists ∈ L I with z < 0,
If there exists ∈ L II with z < K, then q = 0, p =p > 0 and σ = 0 implying z ≥ 0. Thus p z ≥ q z ∀ ∈ L and pz ≥ qz = AK -contradicting 3 above.
With 
. All the components of a k , other than ψ k , belong to compact sets. Hence, there exist for these convergent subsequences. For any such subsequence, if π k also converges, then the limit is a temporary equilibrium according to Definition 4.1. Indeed, let the limit correspond to G N , so that for each j we have π N j ≤ G N . That limit also defines a (N + 1)-equilibrium with π 
